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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the recent debt crisis in Europe, we investigate the influence of board diversity 
on financial fragility and performance of European banks. Corporate governance codes in 
Europe recommend unitary and dual-board systems; therefore, we believe that the influence 
of board diversity may vary across governance mechanisms and that no other studies have 
addressed these variations and their influence on financial fragility across European countries. 
The results show that a critical mass of female representation on both the supervisory board 
and the board of directors may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis. However, 
interestingly, we find evidence that female directors on management board are not risk averse. 
We argue that the degree of risk taking for female directors may vary based on their roles and 
that female and male executive directors may have the same risk taking behaviour. Our 
empirical results provide guidelines to the regulators in Europe with respect to the recently 
approved proposal by the European parliament on female representations. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Finance, Board Diversity, Board Structure. 
 
This version December 2016 
 
Accepted for Publication in the International Review for Financial Analysis 
Journal 
 
                                                          
1
 Corresponding author 
 2 
 
1. Introduction  
World economies have experienced a deep recession due to the global financial crisis. The 
wave of banks’ collapses and scandals in the last decade has fuelled the drive for improved 
corporate governance.  In particular, there has been an increased emphasis on board diversity 
with the main focus being on gender diversity. The concept of board diversity as a means for 
improving corporate governance practices in the financial sector has proliferated in recent 
years following the onset, and the aftermath, of the financial crisis, such that there is a 
growing intervention by the regulators to implement quotas
1
 for corporate boards, a primary 
example of this approach being that of Norway (Mateos de Cabo et al, 2012).  
Recently, the EU Commission (2012) agreed a proposal for a Directive to improve the gender 
balance of non-executive directors (NEDs) in listed companies by 1 January 2020. The 
European Parliament overwhelmingly approved proposals that all EU listed companies 
except small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) should substantially increase the number of 
women on EU corporate boards by setting a minimum objective that 40% of NEDs should be 
of the ‘under-represented gender’, generally women.  
 
There has been an on-going debate in the literature regarding the impact of diversity for many 
years. Jensen (1993) argued that more diverse boards with different perspectives and varied 
skills may lead to more efficiency in resource utilisation. The proponents of board diversity 
argue that diversity brings a variety of backgrounds, skills and perspectives to the boardroom, 
therefore directors and companies may benefit from these diverse social and occupational 
experiences in developing new products and strategies (Anderson et al., 2011).  On the other 
hand, the opponents of diversity claim that the cost of diversity – in terms of communication, 
co-ordination and conflict among directors with different backgrounds - exceeds its benefits 
(Putnam, 2007).  
 
The existing body of the literature tends to focus more on board diversity for non-financial 
companies. Adams and Mehran (2012) argue that little is known about board effectiveness in 
the financial sector as the vast majority of the existing literature tends to exclude financial 
companies from their samples.   Few studies have been conducted on board diversity in the 
banking sector.  Those studies have tended to focus only on one specific country namely US 
e.g. Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011), Berger et al., (2014) and Pathan and Faff (2013).  
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In the European Union, corporate governance codes recommend a unitary board system in 8 
countries e.g. UK and Sweden and a dual-board system in 10 countries e.g. Germany and 
Netherlands, though there might be some exceptions
2
. Therefore, we argue that using pooled 
data from European banks with different governance mechanisms may lead to biased results. 
No other studies- to the best of our knowledge- have addressed the variations in governance 
mechanisms as the proportion of female directors may vary between the board of directors in 
the unitary governance mechanism and the supervisory and management boards within the 
dual board mechanism. Moreover, our study is timely and has clear policy as the empirical 
results provide guidelines to the regulators in Europe with respect to the recently approved 
proposal by the European parliament on female representations. Finally and most importantly, 
none of the existing studies investigate the influence of board diversity on the financial 
fragility. We try to fill these gaps in the literature using a unique hand collected dataset from 
17 European countries.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of board diversity on both financial fragility and 
performance using a sample of 99 European banks from 17 countries over the period 2004-
2012. We find that beyond a critical mass of 18% and 21% female directors on the board of 
directors and the supervisory boards respectively, banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis is 
significantly less. However, interestingly, we find evidence that female directors are not risk 
averse as diversity- financial fragility nexus on management boards is also non-linear but has 
a U shape relationship and that appointing a female director beyond a critical mass of 24% 
increases banks’ risk. This result is consistent with Adams and Funk (2012) and Farag and 
Mallin (2016) as they argue that female directors are not risk-averse compared with their 
male counterparts. We argue that the degree of risk taking for female directors may vary 
based on their roles and that female and male executive directors may have the same risk 
taking behaviour. Finally and consistent with the resource dependence theory, we find a 
positive and significant relationship between the proportion of female directors and financial 
performance for both the board of directors and the supervisory boards. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section discusses the 
theoretical perspectives deriving board diversity followed by a section on the literature and 
hypotheses development. We then present the data and the empirical models followed by the 
results and the robustness tests. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the main 
findings and the policy implications. 
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2. Board Diversity: Theoretical Perspectives  
Several theoretical frameworks from different disciplines provide insights into the economic 
benefits and the influence of board diversity (Carter et al., 2010) e.g. agency, resource 
dependence, human capital, and social psychology theories. Agency theory assumes that a 
higher proportion of independent NEDs may lead to a better monitoring function of the board. 
Therefore, boards should include the appropriate mix of experience and backgrounds to better 
exercise their monitoring role and to evaluate management and assess business strategies 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003 and Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Female representation on the 
board may improve the board’s monitoring role and this may lower agency costs (Carter et al., 
2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Farag and Mallin, 2016). Carter et al. (2003) and Carter et 
al. (2010) argue that more diverse boards with different backgrounds are more independent 
and thus provide a better monitoring role. Nonetheless, agency theory does not provide strong 
support for the link between board diversity and financial performance (Carter et al., 2003). 
According to the resource dependence theory, the presence of female directors on the board 
brings different benefits and resources to the company (Carter et al., 2010). Moreover, 
females bring forward new opinions and perspectives that would not otherwise be 
demonstrated if the board were to be homogeneous, and this may improve financial 
performance (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). Therefore, the resource dependence theory 
provides the foundation and convincing theoretical argument with regard to board diversity 
and suggests that diverse boards have a broader range of more talented and well-connected 
directors. Moreover, board diversity per se may send a positive signal to the labour market 
(Carter et al., 2010).   
 
Furthermore, different types of directors provide different experiences, backgrounds and 
different human capital which may lead to a higher ability to address different environmental 
dependencies (Hillman et al., 2000). Human capital theory states that directors with different 
experiences, sets of skills and educational backgrounds may lead to more diverse boards and 
thus benefit the overall performance of the company (Terjesen et al., 2009).  Moreover, more 
diverse boards with different perspectives and varied skills may lead to more efficiency in 
resource utilisation (Jensen, 1993), better management quality (unique human capital) and 
hence better financial performance (Terjesen et al., 2009).  Therefore, human capital theory 
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complements the resource dependence theory in that board diversity may influence 
companies’ financial performance (Carter et al., 2010).  
 
According to contingency theory, internal and external circumstances are one of the main 
determinants of human capital and hence the influence of gender diversity on financial 
performance may vary based on companies’ internal and external environments (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). On the other hand, the social psychological concept of minority status, which 
is derived from social impact theory, states that majority status groups have a remarkable 
influence on the decision making process (Carter et al., 2010). Therefore females, being 
usually in the minority on diverse boards, may not have the power to influence the board as 
the result of the internal group dynamics of the board (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Moreover, 
more diverse boards may lead to more conflict and diverse opinions which make the decision 
making process time-consuming and less effective (Campbell and Vera, 2008, Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998 and Carter et al., 2010).  
 
Drawing on the critical mass theory of Kanter (1977a, 1977b), Joecks et al (2013) argue that 
the skills that female directors (minority) may bring into the group are not the main 
determinant of board composition unless a critical mass of female directors has been 
appointed
3
. Kogut et al (2014) argue that female quotas might create a critical mass of female 
directors to tip the equilibrium to structural equality defined as “the degree to which women 
directors are connected without relying upon male intermediaries”. 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
3.1 Board Diversity in the Banking Industry 
The literature on corporate governance, and board diversity in particular, is limited for 
financial institutions. The existing literature has tended to focus on the influence of board 
diversity on non- financial companies. Therefore, relatively little is known about the 
influence of board diversity in financial institutions (Adams and Mehran, 2012). However, 
there have been a few studies which have focussed on the impact of board diversity in the 
banking industry; these studies have tended to focus on the US; see for example Richard 
(2000); Adams and Funk (2012); and Hagendorff and Keasey (2012). Board diversity in the 
European banking sector has received scant attention except for the studies by Mateos de 
Cabo et al, (2011 and 2012). Moreover, no other studies-to the best of our knowledge - have 
 6 
 
addressed the variations in governance mechanisms across European countries. Therefore, we 
believe that there remains a gap in the literature regarding the influence of board diversity on 
financial fragility and performance in European banks.  
3.2 Board Diversity and Financial Fragility 
World economies have experienced a deep recession due to the global financial crisis 2007- 
2008. The crisis hit Europe by the contagion effect and concerns were raised about the 
financial fragility of various financial institutions. Subsequently, a large number of financial 
institutions collapsed or were bailed out by governments during the global financial crisis e.g. 
RBS and HBOS in the UK; Dexia, Fortis, Hypo Real Estate and UBS in continental Europe 
(Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010 and Erkens et al., 2012). Grove et al. (2011) define financial 
fragility as a bank’s vulnerability to a financial crisis measured by Loan quality measures e.g. 
Non-Performing Assets (NPA). Beltratti and Stulz, (2012) use other measures of financial 
fragility e.g. the percentage of liquid assets to total assets. They argue that banks with more 
liquid assets will be in a better position to cope with financing difficulties. Moreover, earlier 
Eng and Nabar (2007) used the percentage of loan loss reserve to gross loans as an alternative 
measure of financial difficulties.  
 
The stereotype that women are more risk averse than men may explain the low proportion of 
females sitting on the banks’ boards (Sunden and Surette, 1998). Moreover, this stereotype is 
the main reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on the corporate promotion ladder in banks (Mateos 
de Cabo et al., 2012). Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that boards of directors tend to be 
more homogeneous and less diverse when companies are operating in riskier environments. 
Therefore, there might be less likelihood of hiring female directors in banks due to the high 
financial risk associated with this industry. Moreover, firms with more gender diverse boards 
have been found to be less involved in sub-prime lending (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, female CEOs might be seen as more risk averse compared with their male 
counterparts as they may rely on less leverage (Graham et al., 2013), less long-term debt, and 
their companies have less earning volatility, higher survival rate (Faccio et al., 2016) and less 
involved in acquisitions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013).  Female CEOs also used to exercise their 
share options early compared with their male counterparts (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Arun 
et al (2015) find that the higher the proportion of female independent directors the more 
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restrained earnings management practices in the UK. Sila et al (2016) find that unobserved 
company heterogeneity may derive the negative gender–risk relation.   
 
Adams and Funk (2012) find that female and male directors have substantial differences with 
respect to their risk attitude. This might be due to the belief that women may not perform well 
in less competitive environment (Gneezy et al., 2003 and Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
Consistent with the existing literature, Adams and Funk (2012) find that female directors are 
more benevolent and universally concerned but less power oriented than male directors. 
However, Adams and Funk (2012) show that some of the "typical" population gender gaps 
appear to reverse for directors, in Sweden, since female directors are found to be more open 
to change and less risk-averse than their male counterparts. Therefore, appointing a female 
director need not lead to less risk-averse decisions as female directors are more risk-loving 
than male directors (Adams and Funk,  2012).  
 
Mateos de Cabo et al., (2012) find that the proportion of female directors in boardrooms is 
higher for lower-risk banks; in addition, banks with a growth orientation are more likely to 
appoint female directors.  The above discussion shows that the findings of the existing 
literature support the negative relationship between board diversity and the attitude towards 
risk. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other studies that investigate the influence of 
diversity on financial fragility in European banks. Therefore, based on the above discussion 
we formulate our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of female directors and 
bank’s financial fragility.  
 
3.3 Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
The board diversity-financial performance nexus has been investigated in the academic 
literature for non-financial companies, however, there is mixed evidence and no real 
agreement on the impact of board diversity on firm performance. 
This could be due to the discrepancies in sample sizes, time periods, and industries in 
addition to the econometrics problems e.g. endogeneity.  The diversity- performance nexus is 
more problematic when quotas are applied due to some methodological issues e.g. the exact 
date of the quota event, the choice of control group in the context of experimental studies, 
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sample selection and the influence of other confounding effects e.g. other governance-related 
reforms (Ferreira, 2015). Moreover, there is no formal theory that interprets the diversity-
performance nexus for financial companies therefore the existing literature largely relies on 
the results of the empirical studies of non-financial companies (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
 
A few studies find no positive impact of board diversity on financial performance. Randøy et 
al. (2006) investigate the impact of gender, age and ethnic diversity on the financial 
performance of the top 500 companies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and find no 
significant impact on companies’ financial performance. Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
and Francoeur et al. (2007) find that more gender diverse boards have no impact on company 
performance in the US and Canada respectively. However, Ryan and Haslam (2005) find that 
during a period of poor market performance, companies who appointed female directors had 
tended to have negative performance during the preceding five months compared with 
companies who appointed male directors. 
 
Moreover, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have an overall negative 
effect on firm performance in the US although they enhance the overall effectiveness of the 
board. On the other hand, a large strand of the literature finds that there is a positive influence 
of board diversity on financial performance, mostly in the US; see for instance, Erhardt et al. 
(2003); Miller and Triana (2009) in addition to Campbell and Vera (2008) in Spain. The latter 
study highlights that the causal relationship between these two endogenous variables runs 
from board diversity to financial performance. Moreover, the diversity-performance nexus 
can be partially mediated by both innovation and company reputation (Miller and Triana 
(2009).  
 
 There have been relatively few studies that investigate the relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance in the financial sector. Pathan and Faff (2013) study large 
US bank holding companies over the period 1997-2011 and find that pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX), i.e. 1997-2002, gender diversity improves bank performance; however this positive 
effect declines post-SOX (2003-2006) and the financial crisis (2007-2011) periods 
respectively. Kim and Starks (2016) find that directors’ heterogeneity and the proportion of 
female directors in particular result in higher company valuation. Similarly, Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) find that innovative banks are characterised by heterogeneous boards and this 
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facilitate decision making process. Board diversity in the financial sector is also found to 
have a positive influence on corporate social performance (Siciliano, 1996); and company’s 
competitive advantage (Richard, 2000). Moreover, positive announcement returns to mergers 
are reported by more occupationally diversified boards (Hagendorff and Keasey, 2010 and 
2012).  
 
We believe that board diversity creates both costs and benefits to companies. Drawing on the 
resource dependence and the human capital theories, we believe that female directors may 
bring to the board different backgrounds, experience and opinions and this may lead to better 
financial performance. Therefore, we expect that more diverse boards may have better 
financial performance if the benefits of diversity - in terms of better advisory and monitoring 
roles - exceed the costs of communication and conflict between managerial levels. Based on 
the above discussion we formulate our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female directors and 
bank’s financial performance 
 
4. Methodology  
4.1 Data and Sample 
We hand collect data on board diversity, financial fragility, financial performance and 
governance characteristics for a sample of listed and private European banks over the period 
2004-2012. We constrain our sample to banks located in the EU as they are broadly subject to 
similar regulatory and governance backgrounds. Our sample also includes banks operate in 
Switzerland as part of the single market. Swiss banks are the most widely regarded in Europe as 
they have unique reputation in banking sector globally. Our main source is the “The Bankers top 
1000 World Banks” report which includes financial institutions from all over the globe from 6 
continents. The total number of banks included in the report from EU countries and Switzerland 
is 223 banks. We exclude EU courtiers with less than 2 banks e.g. Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta, 
Slovakia and Luxemburg (11 banks). To be consistent with the literature we exclude credit 
institutions and real estate and mortgage banks due to the differences in their operating structures 
(58 institutions.) Moreover, we excluded 55 banks with missing data either from Bankscope, 
Thomson One Banker and Datastream databases or the annual reports and the websites of the 
respective banks. Thus our final sample is 99 banks 4. Our sample banks is located in 17 countries 
namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, 
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Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK5. We excluded Norway 
as it introduced a compulsory gender quota for listed companies in 2008 by which the percentage 
of female NEDs sitting on the board had to be at least 40%. Moreover, Norway is not a member 
state in the EU6. 
 
Our sample includes both board structures, i.e. unitary and dual boards Therefore, we classify our 
sample into 53 banks with unitary boards and 46 dual board banks for which a complete set of 
information is available. Our dataset is unbalanced panel data and consists of 462 and 393 bank-
year observations for unitary and dual board structures respectively over the period 2004-2012.  
We measure gender diversity by the percentage of female directors sitting on the board
7
.  
Moreover, as the appointment of additional female directors may enhance financial 
performance or reduce risk, we use the squared percentage of female directors as an 
independent variable in the estimation. We define financial fragility as a bank’s vulnerability 
to a financial crisis. Grove et al. (2011) use Non-Performing Assets (NPA) ratio as a measure 
of financial fragility. NPA ratio is calculated by dividing the level of non-performing assets 
to total loans. Grove et al. (2011) argue that loan quality measures e.g. NPA are often used by 
rating agencies to assess the overall ratings of the banks and are considered to be an essential 
credit quality measure with respect to the banks’ lending practices. However, we use a stricter 
measure of banks’ financial fragility namely the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans. 
Moody’s rating agency argue that impaired loans are a better measure of asset quality than 
non-performing assets, as they are more comprehensive, globally comparable, and less prone 
to regulatory discretion
8
. Other measures of financial fragility are also used as a robustness 
check e.g. NPA ratio, the percentage of liquid assets to total assets following Beltratti and 
Stulz, (2012) who argue that banks with more liquid assets will be in a better position to cope 
with financing difficulties. We also use the percentage of loan loss reserve to gross loans as 
an alternative measure of financial fragility following Eng and Nabar (2007). 
 
We use the return on total assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) as measures of a bank’s 
financial performance. We calculate ROA as net income divided by the average of the two 
most recent years of total assets, while we define ROE as net income divided by the average 
of the two most recent years of total equity. We also use the interest rate margin as an 
alternative proxy for banks financial performance. Interest rate margin is the ratio of net 
interest revenue divided by total earning assets. This study incorporates a comprehensive set 
of bank-specific characteristics to control for bank and country heterogeneity. We control for 
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governance characteristics proxied by board size, board independence and CEO/chair duality. 
We measure the board of directors’ size and both supervisory and management board size by 
the total number of board members.  We also control for board independence by using the 
percentage of independent non-executive directors sitting on the board of directors and the 
supervisory board. We believe that board independence may have a positive impact on 
diversity and that more independent boards are more likely to embrace diversity. Moreover, 
combining the roles of CEO/Chair for unitary boards might be seen as an indication of power 
vested in a single individual and hence lead to less diversity. CEO/Chair duality is defined by 
a dummy variable equal to 1 where the roles of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the 
same person, and zero otherwise.  
 
We argue that larger banks tend to have larger boards and are expected to have more diverse 
boards (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Aebi et al., 2012). Therefore, we control for bank size, 
defined by the natural logarithm of total assets in euros. We also control for bank age defined 
as number of years since the bank’s foundation. Moreover, we control for whether the bank is 
listed or privately held by creating a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for private 
banks and 0 otherwise.  
 
Furthermore, we control for the total capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking 
sector. Moreover, to address the differences in legal environments, we create a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank’s headquarter is located in a common law country 
and 0 otherwise. We also use Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural 
differences across EU countries. We use the individual cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001) 
separately and presented the results using the Power Distance dimension (Frijns et al., 2016 
and Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009). Moreover, we control for bank internationalisation 
following the study Ekman et al (2014) by creating a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if a bank has overseas branches and 0 otherwise.  
 
We use The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank 
formulated in 2003, 2007, and 2012. This is a unique survey on how banks are regulated and 
supervised for 143 jurisdictions around the world.  The survey includes questions on banking 
regulations and supervision including disclosure and enforcement dimensions. There are 32 
and 20 Yes/No questions on disclosure and enforcement respectively. Therefore, we 
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developed two indices namely disclosure and enforcement by creating dummy variables take 
the value of 1 if the answer to a question is yes and 0 otherwise. The sum of each dummy is 
the disclosure and enforcement indices respectively
9
.  We also control for the macroeconomic 
indicators by using the natural logarithm of country’s GDP in euros. Finally, country and year 
dummies are used to capture country and time heterogeneity respectively. 
Table 1 presents a description for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.2 Endogeneity  
There has been a long debate in the empirical literature about the endogeneity between board 
diversity and financial performance and in particular their causal relationship. Endogeneity 
results in biased and inconsistent coefficients and this makes statistical inference virtually 
impossible (Wintoki et al, 2012). The existing body of the literature has investigated two 
main sources of endogeneity namely unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity (reverse 
causality) e.g. the causality between board diversity and financial performance; see for 
example Adams and Ferreira (2009 ); Carter et al (2010) and  Pathan and Faff (2013).  
Researchers usually use static panel data (fixed effects model) to control for company 
heterogeneity and any other unobservable company characteristics that may drive the 
results
10
 (e.g. managerial ability); see for example Adams and Ferreira (2009). 
 
Wooldridge (2002) argues that in the case of a dynamic nature of independent variables (e.g. 
gender diversity) and a past dependent variable (e.g. ROA), the fixed effects model may be 
biased. Wintoki et al (2012) claim that the dynamic nature of the governance-performance 
nexus is a potential source of endogeneity. They argue that the current governance 
characteristics (e.g. board size and independence) are a function of past financial performance 
and ignoring this link may have serious consequences for statistical inference. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) argue that higher past financial performance leads to higher CEO ability 
and bargaining power and this may lead to less board independence. We agree with Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998) and argue that higher past financial performance/ fragility may also 
result in less diverse boards when the CEO has greater bargaining power.  
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4.3 Empirical modelling 
To overcome the above econometrics problems and to capture the alternative possible sources 
of endogeneity, we use a dynamic panel data model namely the two-step system GMM. 
Moreover, as a robustness check, we also estimate the fixed effects models. The system 
GMM combines in a system the equation in first-differences with the same equation 
expressed in levels as in equations 1, 2 and 3 respectively.   
 
      ititiitittitiit vYearxFPBDFFFF    '.1.0                         (1) 
      ititiitittitiit vYearxFFBDFPFP    '.1.0                        (2) 
     ititiitittitiit vYearxFFFPBDBD    '.1.0                          (3) 
 
Where, FF is bank financial fragility, FP is bank financial performance, BD is bank board 
gender diversity, itx  is a k*1 vector of corporate governance characteristics (board size, 
independence, CEO power), loan quality and other control variables in addition to bank-and 
country-specific effects. 1'  is a k*1 vector of parameters to be estimated, iv  is the panel 
unobservable heterogeneity (which may be correlated with the covariates), and it  is 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the whole sample with variance 2 . iv  
and it is assumed to be independent for each i over all t. We use the adjustment for small 
samples introduced by Windmeijer (2000) to improve the robustness of our results and to 
avoid any potential bias in the estimated asymptotic standard error.  
 
We use lagged levels instruments for the regression in differences, and lags of the first-
differenced variables for the equation in levels. Therefore, we use three lags of financial 
performance, financial fragility, board size, board independence, and the proportion of female 
directors as instruments in the equation in first-differences, and two lags of their difference as 
instruments in the equation in levels (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; and Wintoki et al., 2012).  
Roodman (2009) and Wintoki et al. (2012) claim that it may be possible to use a set of 
historical values of suspect endogenous variables as a valid internal instrument to control for 
simultaneity and other sources of endogeneity and this eliminates the need for external 
instruments
11
 (Wintoki et al., 2012). We carry out rigorous tests to assess the validity of the 
orthogonality assumptions and the strength of our instruments. We calculate the Arellano and 
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Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation with a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. Rejecting the null in the first-differenced errors for the second or higher 
order suggests that the moment conditions used are not valid (Roodman, 2009). 
 
To test for the over-identifying restrictions, we report the Hansen test results. The null 
hypothesis associated with the Hansen test is that the instruments are exogenous. 
Insignificant values for the Hansen test indicate that the instruments are adequate and that the 
model is correctly specified. Finally, as the residuals may be correlated across banks and 
across time and therefore the standard errors can be biased, we estimate, following Roodman 
(2009), clustered standard errors to produce more robust, reliable and unbiased coefficient 
estimates.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the pooled sample for the main variables used in 
the empirical analysis. We present in Panels A and B the descriptive statistics for the unitary 
and the two tier board banks respectively. The figures presented in Panel A show that the 
average proportion of female directors ranges from 0 % to 58.3% with an average of 10% 
across the unitary boards sample. The average ROA is 0.28% and ranges from  -22.4% to 
9.7%, while the average impaired loans to gross loans is 5.7% with standard deviation of 3.7% 
and ranges from 0.05% to 62.4%. Table 1 also shows that the mean value of the board of 
directors’ size is 14.7 directors with a standard deviation of 4.4 and a range from 4 to 31 
directors during the period of study. The average proportion of the independent non-
executive directors across the sample is 46.4% with a standard deviation of 20.9% and the 
CEO/Chair duality prevails in 3.5% of our sample. Furthermore, the average capital ratio is 
12.2% and 72% of the banks has international branches.  Finally, 19.3% of the sample banks 
are privately held while the average bank age across the sample is 100 years. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Figure 1 presents the average proportion of female directors sitting on European banks with 
unitary boards over the period 2004-2012 by country. We notice that Sweden has the highest 
proportion of female directors of 34.4% followed by Finland and France with average 
proportions of female directors of 22.2% and 17.5% respectively. However, Cyprus, Greece, 
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Italy and Portugal have the lowest proportions of female directors of 4.4%, 4.3%, 3.6% and 
3.3% respectively.  Figure 2 presents the average proportions of female directors in European 
banks with unitary boards from 2004-2012 and shows that the average female representation 
increased from 7.6% in 2004 to 15.3% in 2012. 
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the two-tier board sample banks. We 
notice that the average proportions of female directors sitting on the supervisory and 
management boards are 13.1% and 3% respectively. We also notice that the financial 
performance of dual board banks on average is relatively higher than those of their unitary 
board counterparts as the average ROA is 0.57% and ranges from -2.5% to 2.9%, while the 
average impaired loans to gross loans is 5.3% with a standard deviation of 10.44% and ranges 
from 0.03% to 73.2%. Panel B also shows that the average size of the supervisory board is 
12.6 directors with a standard deviation of 5.6% and ranges from 4 to 29 directors. However, 
the average size of the management board is remarkably much lower with 5.3 directors with a 
maximum of 16 directors during the period of the study. Moreover, the average proportion of 
the independent non-executive directors across the supervisory boards is 68% with a standard 
deviation 18.7%. The average capital ratio as the regulatory requirement is 14.11% and 65% 
of the banks with dual boards has overseas branches.  Finally, 29.5% of the sample banks are 
privately held while the average bank age across the sample is 79.4 years. 
 
Figure 3 presents the average proportions of female directors on the supervisory and 
management boards over the period 2004-2012 by country. We notice that the average 
proportion of female directors on the supervisory board is much higher than those on the 
management board across all countries. Germany has the highest female representation on the 
supervisory board of 18.6% followed by Denmark and Austria with average proportions of 
females of 16.3% and 15.4% respectively. On the other hand the lowest female representation 
is found in Italy and Portugal with averages of 3.5% and 2% respectively. Moreover, Figure 3 
shows that Austria has the highest female representation on the management board (6.3%) 
while there are no female directors sitting on the management board in Portugal. Figure 4 
presents the average proportion of female directors sitting on each of the supervisory and 
management boards over the period 2004-2012. Figure 4 shows that the proportion of female 
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directors on the supervisory board increased from an average of 11.5% in 2004 to 15.8% in 
2012. Moreover, we notice that there is a modest increase in the proportion of female 
directors on the management board from 2.6% in 2004 to 3.7% in 2012. We also notice that 
the proportion of female directors on the supervisory board is higher than those sitting on the 
board of directors. To sum up, Table 3 presents a cross country analysis for board structure 
and diversity for the unitary and dual board sample banks over the period of study. 
 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 and Table 3 about here 
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the correlation matrixes for the main variables used in the empirical 
analysis for the unitary and dual board sample banks respectively. The results show that there 
is no evidence of multicollinearity.  
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
Table 6 presents the results of the system GMM estimator for the influence of female 
directors on EU banks’ financial fragility as defined in Equation 1. Panels A and B present 
the results for the unitary and dual board respectively.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
 
The results presented in Table 6 reject the null hypothesis that lagged endogenous variable 
(impaired loans to gross loans) is zero in Panels A and B for the unitary and dual board banks 
respectively. This implies rejection of a static panel data model in favour of a dynamic model. 
The results of Model 1 show that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between the 
proportion of female directors and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans as a proxy for 
bank’s financial fragility.  
 
However, given the low proportion of female representation on boards and drawing on the 
critical mass theory of Kanter (1977), we believe that appointing a critical mass of female 
directors may have an influence on financial fragility. Therefore, we control for the quadratic 
term of the proportion of female directors as presented in Model 2. We find that, the 
diversity-financial fragility relationship is non-linear and has an inverted U shape. This 
suggests that female directors apparently have a positive impact on banks’ financial fragility. 
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However, appointing a female director beyond a critical mass of 18% may reduce banks’ 
vulnerability to financial crisis
12
. This result is consistent with Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) 
and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) as they argue that female directors tend to be more risk 
averse and this stereotype of being risk averse is the main reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on 
the corporate promotion ladder. Based on the above discussion we cannot reject our first 
hypothesis when a critical mass of female director has been appointed in banks with unitary 
boards. 
 
With respect to dual boards’ banks, the results presented in Model 3 show that there is a 
positive but insignificant relationship between the proportion of female directors on the 
supervisory board and the ratio of impaired loans to total loans. Moreover, consistent with the 
results for the unitary boards, we find that diversity-financial fragility relationship is non-
linear and has an inverted U shape as the coefficient on female directors on supervisory 
boards is positive and highly significant while its quadratic term is negative and highly 
significant as presented in Model 4. This suggests that beyond a critical mass of 21%, 
appointing an additional female director may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis. 
Again, this result is consistent with Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) and Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998). 
 
On the other hand, we find an insignificant relationship between the proportion of female 
directors on the management boards and banks’ financial fragility. However and interestingly, 
when we control for the quadratic term of the proportion of female directors on the 
management boards as in Model 4, we find that the coefficient on the proportion of female 
directors is negative and highly significant however, its quadratic term is positive and highly 
significant. This suggests that diversity- financial fragility nexus on management boards is 
non-linear and has a U shape. This also implies that beyond a critical mass of 24%, appointing an 
additional female director increases banks’ risk. This result is consistent with the study of Adams 
and Funk (2012) in which they argue that female directors are more open to change compared 
with their male counterparts. Therefore, appointing a female director need not lead to less 
risk-averse decisions as female directors are more risk-loving than male directors (Adams and 
Funk,  2012).  
 
The above results are interesting, as we argue that the degree of risk taking behaviour for 
female directors may vary based on their roles. Global statistics shows that female directors 
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are mainly appointed as NEDs and/or INEDs on either board of directors or supervisory 
boards. Table 1 shows that the proportion of female directors on supervisory and 
management boards are 13% and 3% respectively. Therefore, we argue that female executive 
directors may have the same risk taking behaviour as their male counterparts. Based on the 
above results we cannot reject our first hypothesis when a critical mass of female directors 
has been appointed in the supervisory board. However, we reject our first hypothesis with 
respect to management boards when a critical mass of female directors has been appointed. 
Finally, the tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence of first order, but not second 
order serial correlation. The models are well specified as the Hansen test does not reject the 
over-identifying restrictions. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the system GMM estimator for the influence of female 
directors on EU banks’ financial performance as defined in Equation 2. Panels A and B 
present the results for the unitary and dual board respectively.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
 
The results presented in Table 7 reject the null hypothesis that lagged endogenous variable 
(ROA) is zero in Panels A and B. This implies rejection of a static panel data model in favour 
of a dynamic model. The results presented in Model 1 show that there is a positive and 
significant relationship at the 5% level between diversity and financial performance of 
unitary board banks. This suggests that the higher the proportion of female directors the 
higher the bank’s financial performance. Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Anderson et al. (2011) 
argue that operationally complex companies may benefit from more diverse boards as the 
different perspectives and viewpoints of board members lead to better monitoring benefits for 
the shareholders and a stronger advisory role for managers. In Model 2, we estimate the 
effect of appointing an additional female director on financial performance. Drawing on the 
critical mass theory of Kanter (1977), Joecks et al (2013) argue that the influence of female 
directors is not the main determinant of board composition unless a critical mass of female 
directors has been appointed. Therefore, we expect that diversity-performance relationship 
might be non-linear and appointing a critical mass of female directors may have an influence 
on financial performance.  
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Interestingly, when we control for the quadratic term of the proportion of female directors in 
Model 2, we find that there is a positive and significant relationship at the 5% level between 
boards’ gender diversity and banks’ financial performance.  Moreover, we find a negative 
and significant (P<5%) relationship between the quadratic term of the proportion of female 
directors and financial performance. This implies that the performance-diversity relationship 
is non-linear and has an inverted U shape; meaning that appointing up to 21% female 
directors may increase financial performance after which appointing an additional female 
director may result in a decrease in financial performance
13
.  
 
This result is consistent with those presented in Table 6 as appointing additional female 
directors may lead to lower risk and hence lower financial performance.  Furthermore, Lang 
(1986), Arrow (1998), Putnam (2007), O’Reilly et al. (1989) find that diversity may cause 
communication problems and increases the inter-group conflicts and this may lead to lower 
financial performance. Our result is also consistent with Carter et al. (2010) who argue that, 
according to contingency theory, the net effect of gender diversity can be either positive or 
negative from a financial performance perspective. Based on the above results we reject our 
second hypothesis when a critical mass of female director has been appointed in banks with 
unitary boards. 
 
With respect to dual boards, the results presented in Panel B show that there is a positive and 
significant (P<5%) relationship between the proportion of female directors on supervisory 
boards and banks’ financial performance as in Model 3. This suggests that the higher the 
proportion of female directors the better the financial performance. This result is consistent 
with the resource dependence theory and human capital theory. However, we find that the 
coefficient on the quadratic term of female directors on the supervisory board is negative and 
highly significant as in Model 4. This suggests that the diversity-performance relationship is 
non-linear and has an inverted U shape and that appointing an additional female director 
beyond a critical mass of 23% may reduce the financial performance.  
 
By contrast for management boards, we find that diversity-performance has a U shape 
relationship and appointing an additional female director beyond a critical mass of 27% may 
have a positive impact on financial performance as presented in Model 4. The above results 
are consistent with Lang (1986), Arrow (1998), Putnam (2007), O’Reilly et al. (1989). 
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Moreover, it is consistent with our arguments regarding the degree of risk attitude of female 
directors on management boards. Based on the above discussion we reject our second 
hypothesis when a critical mass of female directors has been appointed in supervisory board. 
However, we cannot reject our second hypothesis with respect to management boards beyond 
a critical mass of female directors. Finally, the tests regarding serial correlation reject the 
absence of first order, but not second order serial correlation. The models are well specified 
as the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions. 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the system GMM estimator for the main determinants for the 
proportion of female directors on EU banks as defined in Equation 3. Panels A, B and C 
present the results for the board of directors (unitary board), supervisory and management 
boards (dual boards) respectively.  
 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
 
Again, the results presented in Table 8 reject the static panel data model in favour of a 
dynamic model. In Panel A, we find a negative but insignificant relationship between banks’ 
financial fragility and the proportion of female directors. On the other hand, the results show 
that there is a negative and significant (P<5) relationship between financial performance and 
the proportion of female directors on European banks with unitary boards. This may imply 
that the higher the financial performance the lower the board diversity. 
 
We agree with Adams and Ferreira (2009) that diverse boards are likely to be associated with 
stronger governance characteristics. Looking at our results in Model 1, we find a positive and 
significant (P<5%) relationship between both board size and independence and the proportion 
of female representation on the board of directors. This suggests that female directors are 
likely to be appointed in larger and more independence boards. This result is consistent with 
Brammer et al. (2007) and Conyon and Mallin (1997) as they find that larger boards and 
boards with a higher proportion of NEDs are more likely to have a higher percentage of 
female directors.  
 
With respect to the main determinants of the female representation on supervisory boards, the 
results presented in Model 2 are similar to those of the board of directors presented in Model 
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1 and thus board size and independence are the main determinants for the proportion of 
female directors. Moreover, we find that big banks tend to have higher proportion of female 
directors compared with smaller banks. Furthermore, the results show that there is a positive 
and significant relationship between power distance index and female representation on the 
supervisory board. The index is concerned with the expectations of less powerful members in 
a society with respect to equal distribution of power. This suggests that in countries with dual 
board banks people accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and the power 
is distributed equally (Hofstede, 2001). 
 
With respect to the main determinants of female representation on management boards, we 
find a negative and highly significant relationship between banks’ financial fragility and the 
proportion of female directors on management boards. This suggests that the higher the banks’ 
financial fragility the lower the proportion of female directors. This may imply that banks 
with higher risk and more vulnerability to financial crisis (e.g. due to the poor loan quality) 
are likely to be associated with less diverse management boards. This may also suggest that 
high risk and more financially fragile banks are less likely to appoint female directors and 
this due to the belief that females are more risk averse and would tend not to condone more 
risky decisions.  We also find a positive and highly significant relationship between financial 
performance and the female representation on management boards. 
 
Moreover, we find a negative and highly significant relationship between management board 
size and gender diversity. This result is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009) as they 
argue that boards tend to be more homogeneous and less diverse when companies are 
operating in riskier environments. Table 2 shows that the average proportion of female 
directors on management board is 3% and this suggests that management boards are maily 
homogenous and male dominated. Adams and Ferreira (2007) also argue that in riskier 
environments homogeneous boards may reduce monitoring process as board heterogeneity 
may be considered as a potential source of conflict and difficulties in decision making.  
Furthermore, the results also show that, listed companies are likely to have a higher 
proportion of female directors on management boards. Our models are well specified as the 
tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence of first order, but not the second order and 
the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions. 
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As robustness checks, we estimate the fixed effects regressions for both unitary and dual 
boards’ banks and obtained similar results. We also re-estimate the regression models pre and 
post the global financial crisis and found that our results are more robust during the period 
post crisis as we find that the higher the proportion of female directors the lower the banks’ 
vulnerability to financial crisis.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
There has been an ongoing debate about the rationale and importance of board diversity. 
Female under-representation has long been a global phenomenon in developed and 
developing countries despite the benefits that female directors may bring to boardrooms. For 
instance the proportion of female CEOs in the US is 3% while the proportion of female 
directors ranges between 10-15% (Kogut et al., 2014). Female directors’ under-representation 
might be partially caused by fact that women tend to be strongly represented in some non-
board roles e.g. human resources and customer care (Higgs, 2003). However, there is a 
remarkable increase in the proportion of female directors over the past few years in particular 
during, and after, the financial crisis. This might be due to the changes in legislation e.g. 
female quotas.  
In this paper, we investigate the influence of board diversity on both financial fragility and 
performance for a sample of 99 banks from 17 countries over the period 2004-2012. The 
results of the system GMM estimator show that the diversity-financial fragility relationship is 
non-linear and has an inverted U shape. This suggests that beyond a critical mass of 18% and 
21% appointing an additional female director on the board of directors and the supervisory 
boards respectively may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis. This result is 
consistent with Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) as they 
argue that female directors tend to be more risk averse and this stereotype of being risk averse 
is the main reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on the corporate promotion ladder.  
 
However interestingly, we find evidence that female directors are not risk averse as diversity- 
financial fragility nexus on management boards is also non-linear but has a U shape and that 
appointing an additional female director beyond a critical mass of 24% increases banks’ risk. 
Adams and Funk (2012) argue that female directors are not less risk-averse. Therefore, 
appointing a female director need not lead to less risk-averse decisions as female directors are 
more risk-loving than male directors (Adams and Funk,  2012). We argue that the degree of 
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risk taking behaviour for female directors may vary based on their roles. Farag and Mallin 
(2016) find that female CEOs are not risk averse compared with their male counterparts. 
Therefore, we argue that female and male executive directors may have the same risk taking 
behaviour. 
 
We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of female 
directors and financial performance for both the board of directors and the supervisory boards. 
This result is consistent with resource dependence theory and human capital theory. 
Moreover, we find that diversity- performance nexus is non-linear and have an inverted U 
shape. This implies that beyond a critical mass of 21% and 23%, appointing an additional 
female director on the board of directors and the supervisory boards respectively decreases 
financial performance. Board diversity may cause communication problems and increases the 
inter-group conflicts and this may lead to lower financial performance (Lang, 1986; Arrow, 
1998; Putnam, 2007; O’Reilly et al., 1989). 
 
On the other hand, we find that diversity- performance nexus on management boards is non-
linear and has a U shape. Therefore, appointing a female director beyond a critical mass of 27% 
may lead to better financial performance. This result is consistent with Carter et al. (2010) as 
the net effect of gender diversity can be either positive or negative from a financial 
performance perspective. The result is also consistent with our argument on the risk-taking 
behaviour of female directors with respect to their role as executive directors. 
 
We also find that board size and independence are the main determinants for the proportion 
of female directors on the board of directors and the supervisory boards. This result is 
consistent with Brammer et al. (2007) and Conyon and Mallin (1997). On the other hand, 
management boards seem to be more homogenous and less diverse. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) argue that boards tend to be more homogeneous and less diverse when companies are 
operating in riskier environments. Finally, we find that banks with higher risk and more 
vulnerability to financial crisis (e.g. due to the poor loan quality) are likely to be associated 
with less diverse management boards.  
 
This study has a number of policy implications especially. The relationship between board 
diversity and bank risk may potentially have important implications for the stability and 
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increased confidence in the banking sector. Our empirical results provide support for the calls 
by various government reports e.g. Lord Davies Report in 2011 and its subsequent annual 
updates for more board diversity in the UK and the European Commission (2012) 
recommendations on board diversity. However, given the striking results of the influence of 
critical mass of female directors, policy makers should carefully address the concerns 
regarding the economic impact of the call for more diverse boards or imposing female quotas. 
Although it is not easy to draw a conclusion on the impact of female quotas on financial 
performance (Ferreira, 2015), in Norway for instance, once the law was passed, there was a 
remarkable decline (23%) in the proportion of public limited companies whilst a higher 
proportion of the Norwegian companies listed in London (Kogut et al., 2014). Moreover, 
imposing the 40% quota in Norway was associated with lower financial performance (Ahern 
and Dittmar, 2012). Kogut et al (2014) argue that a small quota (between 10% and 20%) can 
achieve large structural consequences and social justice. We agree with Kogut et al (2014) 
that small quotas may be preferable as they are the key to better structural equality as female 
quotas may enhance their network and connectivity and this may lead to a better position for 
female directors. 
 Future research might investigate the relationship between banks’ specific characteristics and 
the propensity to appoint female directors, and to investigate the impact of the appointment of 
a new female director on board dynamics and on the bank’s overall risk and return.  
Moreover, we believe that a further analysis of the influence of board diversity on corporate 
sustainability and risk-taking behaviour may provide additional insights to the results of our 
empirical study.  
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ENDNOTES
                                                          
1
In January 2006 Norway enforced a gender quota requirement on listed companies with the target of 40% females on the 
board by 2008. Whilst the UK and many other countries have not introduced binding gender quotas to facilitate board 
diversity, nonetheless there has been a move by governments towards targets for gender representation on boards, for 
example the Davies Report (2011) and its subsequent annual updates in the UK.  
2
 In the remaining 9 countries a hybrid system applies and companies can choose between a one and two-tier approach. 
Moreover, in some European countries e.g. registered companies in Italy, there is the choice to follow one of three 
governance models: a unitary governance systems; a dual governance system with distinct supervisory and management 
functions; or the traditional model in Italy with a decision-making board and a separate board of auditors. 
3
 Kanter (1977b) suggests that group interaction can be classified into 4 areas namely uniform, skewed, tilted, and balanced 
groups. In the uniform groups, all members have the same characteristics i.e. male or female in the context of gender. When 
the male type dominates, the group is identified as skewed. Joecks et al (2013) report that the proportion of females in  
skewed groups is up to 20%.  However, the tilted group has less extreme distribution compared with the skewed group as 
females (as the minority) can impact the group culture. Female representation in the tilted group ranges from 20-40% 
(Joecks et al., 2013). Finally, the balanced group focuses on the pool of talent and skills and not on the proportion of males 
and females (sub-groups). In the balanced group, the female representation ranges from 40-60% on average and the 
performance of the balanced group is expected to be higher than the skewed group (Kanter, 1977 and Joecks et al., 2013). 
4
 Andres and Vallelado (2008- JBF p2572) investigated the role of the board of directors using a sample of 65 banks from six 
countries over the period 1996-2006.  
5
 Some countries have recently introduced gender quota e.g. France (2016), Italy (2015), Spain (2015), Germany 
(2016) and the Netherlands (2016). For more details, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/womenonboards/factsheet_women_on_boards_web_2015-10_en.pdf 
6
 We estimate our models with and without Sweden as obvious outlier with respect to the proportion of female 
directors and find similar results. 
7
 We also use Blau index as an alternative measure of board diversity. Blau index is calculated as the percentage 
of board members in each category (male/female). The index values range from 0 to 0.5 which occurs when the 
board is equally balanced. 
8
 See for instance    https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Impaired-loans-better-gauge-of-Taiwanese-banks-asset-
quality--PR_257689 
9
 For more details please see  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:
64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#Original_Database_by_country__40kb_each_ 
10
 Fixed effects model has a strict exogeneity assumption in which, for instance, current board diversity and 
governance characteristics are independent of past financial performance variables. 
11
 Although the higher order of lag lengths result in more exogenous instruments, the use of internal instruments 
may cause the problem of weak instruments as the number of lags increases (Wintoki et al., 2012). However, we used 
different lag lengths as an empirical trade-off.  
12
 We find similar results when we use both the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets and the ratio of loan loss reserve 
to gross loans.  
13
 We find similar results when we use ROE and interest margin as alternative proxies for financial performance; however 
the results are marginally significant when we use ROE. 
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Table 1: Variables Description 
 
Variable Description 
Female Proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors. 
FemaleSB Proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board. 
FemaleMgtB Proportion of female directors sitting on the management board.  
ROA Ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of 
total assets.   
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%) The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility. 
B.Size Total number of directors sitting on the board directors 
SB.Size Total number of directors sitting on the supervisory board;  
Mgt.B.Size Total number of directors sitting on the management board.  
INED Proportion of independent non-executive directors.  
CEO/Chair Dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman 
are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise. 
LnTA Natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size.  
BankAge Bank age calculated as the number of years since bank’s foundation.  
ListDummy Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 
otherwise.  
Total capital ratio Total capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector.   
Power Distance A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the 
cultural differences across EU countries.  
Disclosure Index Sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to 32 questions on 
disclosure from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by 
the World Bank is yes and 0 otherwise.  
Enforcement Index Sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to 20 questions on 
enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by 
the World Bank is yes and 0 otherwise.  
Overseas Branches Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branch(es) and 0 
otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation. 
Law Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks’ headquarter is 
located in a common law country and 0 otherwise. 
lnddp Natural logarithm of gross domestic product in euros. 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 30 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample over the period 2004-2012 
 
 Mean Median SD Min Max N 
Panel A: Unitary Boards 
Female 0.100 0.071 0.107 0.000 0.583 449 
ROA (%) 0.281 0.540 2.331 -22.429 9.783 446 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%) 5.778 3.777 7.410 0.048 62.373 417 
B.Size 14.712 15.000 4.389 4.000 31.000 458 
INED 0.464 0.500 0.209 0.105 0.933 456 
NoCom 3.717 4.000 1.542 1.000 6.000 435 
CEO/Chair 0.035 0.000 0.184 0.000 1.000 458 
LnTA 11.410 11.150 1.668 7.781 14.882 447 
Bank Age 100.263 82.000 93.533 3.000 540.00 460 
List Dummy 0.193 0.000 0.395 0.000 1.000 462 
Total capital ratio 12.231 11.500 3.451 8.101 31.558 451 
Power Distance 48.318 50.000 13.447 28.000 68.000 462 
Disclosure Index 20.977 21.000 1.433 19.000 23.000 455 
Enforcement Index 13.036 14.000 3.801 7.000 18.000 453 
Overseas Branches 0.716 1.000 4.511 0.000 1.000 462 
Panel B: Two-Tier Boards 
FemaleSB 0.131 0.111 0.113 0.000 0.511 392 
FemaleMgtB 0.029 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.500 392 
ROA 0.574 0.465 0.772 -2.574 2.989 376 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%) 5.391 3.189 10.445 0.030 73.275 322 
SB.Size 12.620 11.000 5.604 4.000 29.000 392 
Mgt.B.Size 5.349 4.500 2.809 2.000 16.000 392 
INED 0.680 0.667 0.187 0.167 1.000 392 
LnTA 10.626 10.421 2.030 6.436 14.625 377 
Bank Age 79.471 75.000 64.382 3.000 275.00 393 
List Dummy 0.295 0.000 0.457 0.000 1.000 393 
Total capital ratio 14.111 13.000 4.588 8.712 37.167 343 
Power Distance 33.793 35.000 17.695 11.000 68.000 393 
Disclosure Index 21.468 22.000 1.273 20.000 23.000 393 
Enforcement Index 15.442 15.000 2.247 12.000 18.000 393 
Overseas Branches 0.646 1.000 0.478 0.000 1.000 393 
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female directors 
sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the management board; 
ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets.  Impaired 
Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; B.Size: total 
number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory 
board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the management board; INED: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and 
Chairman are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a 
proxy for bank size; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank’s foundation; ListDummy: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; Total capital ratio: capital ratio 
as a regulatory requirement in banking sector;  Power Distance:  A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework 
(2001) to control for the cultural differences across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of 
dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise; Overseas Branches: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branch(es) and 0 otherwise as a proxy for 
internationalisation. 
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Table 3: Board Structure and Diversity for Unitary and Dual Board Sample Banks 
 Belgium Cyprus Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
Panel A: Unitary Boards 
Female 0.076 0.044 0.222 0.175 0.050 0.114 0.036 0.033 0.097 0.344 0.105 
B.Size 18.630 12.471 9.000 17.333 13.738 9.906 16.736 25.692 14.655 13.074 14.653 
INED 0.284 0.493 0.451 0.511 0.243 0.578 0.528 0.278 0.456 0.631 0.510 
Panel B: Dual Boards 
 Austria Denmark Germany Italy Poland Portugal Netherland Switzerland    
FemSB 0.154 0.163 0.186 0.035 0.079 0.020 0.113 0.126    
FemMgtB 0.063 0.022 0.025 0.005 0.034 0.000 0.017 0.025    
SB.Size 17.583 10.206 16.783 19.750 8.400 16.846 8.809 9.824    
Mgt.B.Size 4.139 3.079 6.033 10.750 6.756 5.923 4.506 8.500    
INED 0.645 0.676 0.736 0.735 0.613 0.556 0.711 0.690    
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the board directors; INED: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board;  SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the management board. During 
the period of study, some countries follow a mixture of unitary and dual board structure.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Unitary Board Sample Banks 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ROA 1.000                
2 Female 0.112 1.000               
3 B.Size 0.098 -0.166 1.000              
4 INED 0.038 0.324 -0.116 1.000             
5 CEO/Chair 0.010 -0.112 0.018 0.142 1.000            
6 LnTA 0.024 0.349 0.354 0.356 -0.176 1.000           
7 Impaired Loans/Gross Loans -0.423 -0.142 -0.225 -0.008 0.010 -0.197 1.000          
8 Bank Age -0.018 -0.089 0.082 0.081 -0.068 0.231 -0.001 1.000         
9 List Dummy 0.047 -0.223 -0.183 -0.223 0.177 -0.347 0.012 -0.129 1.000        
10 Power Distance -0.027 -0.327 0.437 -0.376 0.024 -0.026 0.053 -0.076 -0.130 1.000       
11 Disclosure Index -0.063 -0.204 -0.083 0.239 0278 -0.331 0.174 0.035 0.179 -0.045 1.000      
12 Enforcement Index -0.271 -0.337 0.038 -0.155 0.155 -0.386 0.366 -0.067 -0.036 0.434 0.437 1.000     
13 Total Capital Ratio 0.184 0.208 -0.137 0.101 -0.145 0.054 0.071 -0.024 -0.025 -0.091 -0.189 -0.320 1.000    
14 Law -0.048 0.048 -0.290 0.222 -0.117 0.150 0.002 0.102 0.145 -0.444 0.308 -0.411 0.096 1.000   
15 Overseas Branches 0.151 0.132 0.242 0.114 -0.119 0.451 -0.241 0.175 -0.350 0.035 -0.172 -0.296 0.089 -0.003 1.000  
16 lnGDP 0.187 0.274 0.225 0.268 0.139 0.427 -0.321 0.266 0.104 -0.165 -0.129 -0.383 -0.119 0.013 0.293 1.000 
ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets; Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; B.Size: total 
number of directors sitting on the board directors; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of 
the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
(%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise. Power Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural 
differences across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from 
the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; 
Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarter is located in a common law country and 0 otherwise; Overseas Branches: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if a bank has overseas branch(es) and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation; lnddp: natural logarithm of gross domestic product in euros;  Bold figures indicate 
significance at the 5% level or below. 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Dual Board Sample Banks 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ROA 1.000                
2 FemSB -0.248 1.000               
3 FemMgtB 0.022 0.100 1.000              
4 SB.Size -0.295 0.074 0.006 1.000             
5 Mgt.B.Size 0.0004 -0.105 -0.090 0.119 1.000            
6 INED -0.144 0.205 0.063 0.150 0.230 1.000           
7 LnTA -0.327 0.078 -0.095 0.364 0.452 0.321 1.000          
8 Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 0.088 -0.176 0.026 -0.092 -0.009 -0.129 -0.200 1.000         
9 Bank Age -0.059 0.204 -0.062 0.221 -0.061 0.271 0.022 -0.152 1.000        
10 List Dummy -0.133 0.053 -0.053 -0.331 -0.254 -0.025 -0.346 -0.087 -0.271 1.000       
11 lnGDP -0.013 0.136 -0.090 -0.073 0.093 0.130 0.279 0.074 -0.198 -0.141 1.000      
12 Power Distance 0.285 -0.281 -0.106 -0.256 0.400 -0.046 0.136 0.294 -0.342 -0.132 0.199 1.000     
13 Disclosure Index 0.054 -0.088 -0.082 -0.090 0.378 0.101 0.327 0.202 -0.278 -0.050 0.346 0.422 1.000    
14 Enforcement Index -0.223 0.085 -0.091 -0.217 -0.365 0.138 0.001 -0.274 0.105 0.387 0.219 -0.343 -0.125 1.000   
15 Total Capital Ratio 0.008 0.212 0.141 -0.218 0.054 0.019 -0.004 -0.050 -0.057 0.070 0.054 -0.015 0.020 -0.065 1.000  
16 Overseas Branches 0.055 -0.080 0.111 0.092 0.222 0.102 0.308 -0.285 -0.171 -0.046 -0.132 0.172 0.088 -0.039 0.044 1.000 
ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets; FemaleSB: proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board; 
FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the management board; SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of 
directors sitting on the management board; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank 
foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lnddp: natural logarithm of gross domestic product in euros; Power 
Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of 
dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, 
is yes and 0 otherwise; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Overseas Branches: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has 
overseas branch(es) and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation.. Bold figures indicate significance at the 5% level or below. 
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Table 6: The Influence of Female Directors on Financial Fragility for EU Banks: 
System GMM Estimator  
 Panel A  Panel B 
 Unitary Boards Dual Boards 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. Impaired Loans/Gross Loans  
1.154
***
 
(0.076) 
1.237
***
 
(0.064) 
0.793
***
 
(0.053) 
0.826
***
 
(0.042) 
Female 
6.654 
(8.829) 
25.520
**
 
(12.826) 
  
Female sq  
-72.078
**
 
(34.480) 
  
FemSB   
3.471 
(4.320) 
22.814
***
 
(6.893) 
FemSB sq    
-54.393
***
 
(17.569) 
FemMgtB   
4.123 
(3.835) 
-21.127
***
 
(4.912) 
FemMgtB sq    
43.791
***
 
(16.622) 
ROA -0.306 
(0.921) 
-2.010
**
 
(0.809) 
-0.040 
(0.977) 
-0.461
*
 
(0.274) 
B.Size 
0.196 
(0.295) 
-0.001 
(0.189) 
  
SB.Size   
0.227
**
 
(0.108) 
-0.019 
(0.192) 
Mgt.B.Size   
-0.354 
(0.465) 
0.211 
(0.414) 
INED 
9.304 
(5.892) 
0.975 
(3.108) 
1.369 
(3.406) 
0.898 
(3.976) 
CEO/Chair 
-2.729 
(4.012) 
-3.298 
(3.544) 
  
LnTA 
-0.040 
(0.566) 
-0.280 
(0.527) 
0.896 
(0.861) 
-0.071 
(0.471) 
Bank Age 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.031
**
 
(0.013) 
Total Capital Ratio 
-0.752
***
 
(0.269) 
0.218
*
 
(0.125) 
-0.038 
(0.069) 
0.083 
(0.085) 
List Dummy 
15.508
***
 
(4.801) 
1.591 
(3.231) 
3.714 
(4.421) 
-7.593
**
 
(3.048) 
lnGDP 
-2.564
**
 
(1.154) 
0.293 
(0.543) 
0.646 
(1.453) 
-3.260
**
 
(1.397) 
Power Distance 
-0.376
***
 
(0.135) 
-0.014 
(0.067) 
0.102 
(0.075) 
-0.029 
(0.056) 
Disclosure Index 
-2.554
**
 
(1.067) 
0.246 
(0.506) 
-1.136 
(1.190) 
1.355
*
 
(0.703) 
Enforcement Index 
0.573
*
 
(0.317) 
-0.240 
(0.239) 
-0.572 
(0.531) 
1.072
**
 
(0.514) 
Overseas Branches 
10.297
***
 
(2.921) 
-0.750 
(2.142) 
-7.282
***
 
(1.857) 
-4.606
**
 
(1.870) 
Law 
-9.110
**
 
(3.954) 
-1.463 
(1.975) 
  
Constant 
93.959
***
 
(35.424) 
-6.219 
(15.424) 
15.513 
(14.577) 
4.363 
(10.079) 
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Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test  p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)   p.value 0.038 0.043 0.020 0.014 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)   p.value 0.443 0.669 0.405 0.933 
Hansen test p.value      0.881 0.473 0.937 0.508 
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total 
assets.  Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial 
fragility; B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the 
management board; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, 
and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; BankAge: 
bank age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lngdp: natural logarithm of gross domestic 
product in euros; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Power 
Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences 
across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if 
the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise; Overseas Branches: dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branch(es) and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation. 
Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarter is located in a common law 
country and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Clustered robust standard errors are present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 
Table 7: The Influence of Female Directors on Financial Performance for EU Banks: 
System GMM Estimator 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Unitary Boards Dual Boards 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. ROA  -0.046** 
(0.021) 
0.065
***
 
(0.018) 
0.207
***
 
(0.029) 
0.033
***
 
(0.012) 
Female 
5.443
**
 
(2.641) 
11.682
**
 
(4.761) 
  
Female sq  
-27.672
**
 
(13.609) 
  
FemSB    
2.420
**
 
(0.968) 
10.955
***
 
(3.717) 
FemSB sq    
-23.500
***
 
(8.800) 
FemMgtB   
-2.295 
(1.454) 
-7.388
**
 
(3.418) 
FemMgtB sq    
13.434
**
 
(6.711) 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
-0.035 
(0.041) 
0.007 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
B.Size 
-0.066 
(0.081) 
-0.071 
(0.093) 
  
SB.Size   
-0.104
***
 
(0.025) 
-0.158
***
 
(0.038) 
Mgt.B.Size   
0.235
**
 
(0.120) 
0.260
**
 
(0.121) 
INED 
-0.475 
(1.703) 
-0.412 
(1.717) 
3.262
***
 
(1.159) 
3.250
***
 
(1.065) 
CEO/Chair 
-1.344 
(1.297) 
-0.800 
(1.334) 
  
LnTA 
-0.220 
(0.263) 
-0.214 
(0.243) 
-0.495
***
 
(0.157) 
-0.459
***
 
(0.174) 
Bank Age 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Total Capital Ratio 
0.133
***
 
(0.047) 
0.145
***
 
(0.049) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
List Dummy 
-0.424 
(2.086) 
-0.917 
(2.036) 
-1.932
*
 
(1.108) 
-1.108 
(1.130) 
lnGDP 
0.437 
(0.408) 
0.554 
(0.382) 
-0.639
*
 
(0.352) 
-0.602
*
 
(0.356) 
Power Distance 
0.026 
(0.039) 
0.023 
(0.037) 
-0.032
**
 
(0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
Disclosure Index 
0.140 
(0.313) 
0.177 
(0.326) 
0.374 
(0.282) 
0.319 
(0.308) 
Enforcement Index 
-0.141
*
 
(0.075) 
-0.122 
(0.102) 
0.036 
(0.171) 
-0.015 
(0.159) 
Overseas Branches 
-0.387 
(1.094) 
-0.182 
(1.236) 
0.359 
(0.775) 
0.794 
(1.006) 
Law  
-0.552 
(1.323) 
-0.905 
(1.366) 
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Constant 
-6.419 
(9.889) 
-9.217 
(9.619) 
5.550 
(4.003) 
5.736 
(4.117) 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test  p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)   
p.value 
0.038 0.043 0.031 0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)   
p.value 
0.266 0.264 0.711 0.887 
Hansen test p.value      0.732 0.931 0.617 0.901 
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total 
assets.  Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial 
fragility; B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the 
management board; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, 
and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; BankAge: bank 
age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lngdp: natural logarithm of gross domestic 
product in euros; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Power 
Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences 
across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if 
the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise;  Overseas Branches: dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branch(es) and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation; 
Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarter is located in a common law 
country and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Clustered robust standard errors are present. 
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Table 8: The Determinants of the Proportion of Female Directors in EU Banks: System 
GMM Estimator 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Board of Directors Supervisory Board Management  Board 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
L. Female 
0.955
***
 
(0.096) 
  
L.FemSB  
0.798
***
 
(0.129) 
 
L.FemMgtB   
0.852
***
 
(0.025) 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
ROA -0.016
**
 
(0.008) 
-0.027 
(0.033) 
0.015
***
 
(0.004) 
B.Size 
0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
  
SB.Size  
0.017
**
 
(0.008) 
 
Mgt.B.Size    
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
INED 
0.116
**
 
(0.057) 
0.401
**
 
(0.201) 
 
CEO/Chair 
-0.022 
(0.042) 
  
LnTA 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.033
**
 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Bank Age 
0.0004 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.0004) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
Total Capital Ratio 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.006
**
 
(0.003) 
0.001
***
 
(0.0002) 
List Dummy 
-0.061 
(0.053) 
-0.122 
(0.108) 
-0.028
**
 
(0.013)    
lnGDP 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
-0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Power Distance 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Disclosure Index 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Enforcement Index 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.032 
(0.020) 
0.007
***
 
(0.001) 
Overseas Branches 
0.032 
(0.052) 
0.027 
(0.101) 
0.024
**
 
(0.012) 
Law 
-0.053 
(0.046) 
  
Constant 
0.196 
(0.204) 
-0.330 
(0.440) 
-0.035 
(0.091) 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Bank type Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test  p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1)   p.value 
0.000 0.016 0.039 
Arellano-Bond test for 0.799 0.418 0.927 
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AR(2)   p.value 
Hansen test p.value      0.940 0.922 0.986 
L. Female: lagged proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; L.FemaleSB: lagged proportion of 
female directors sitting on the supervisory board; L.FemaleMgtB: lagged proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets.  
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; B.Size: 
total number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory 
board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the management board; INED: proportion of independent non-
executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman are 
conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank 
size; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lngdp: natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
in euros ;Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Power Distance: A dimension 
from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences across EU countries; Disclosure and 
Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and 
enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 
otherwise; Overseas Branches: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branch(es) and 0 otherwise 
as a proxy for internationalisation; Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarter is 
located in a common law country and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Clustered robust standard errors are present. 
 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 
 
 
     
0.076 0.074 0.08 0.08 
0.093 0.101 
0.113 
0.13 
0.153 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 2:  Average Proportion of Female Directors 
sitting on European Banks with Unitary Boards 2004-
2012 
0.154 0.163 
0.186 
0.035 
0.113 
0.079 
0.02 
0.126 
0.063 0.022 0.025 0.005 0.017 0.034 0 0.025 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Figure 3: Average Proportion of Female Directors 
sitting on European Banks with Dual Boards by 
Country 
FemSB FemMgt
0.115 
0.124 0.127 0.117 
0.128 0.124 
0.132 
0.15 
0.158 
0.026 0.024 0.033 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.037 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 4:  Average Proportion of Female Directors sitting on 
European Banks with Dual Boards 2004-2012 
FemSB FemMgt
0.344 
0.222 
0.175 
0.114 0.105 0.097 0.076 0.044 0.043 0.036 0.033 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Figure 1:  Average Proportion of Female Directors sitting 
on European Banks with Unitary Boards by Country 
